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To Live Better, 
To Change Life by Mark Burford*
The Common Programme of the French Left, 
1972-1978 Soon after the signing of the "Common 
Programme for a Government of Left Union" 
by the French Communist Party (PCF), 
Socialist Party (PS) and Left Radicals, the 
Socialist leader F ranco is M itte rran d  
remarked to his Second International 
colleagues in Vienna that in time the PCF 
vote in the French electorate would be 
reduced to 15 percent of the electorate with 
equivalen t gains tran sfe rrin g  to the 
socialists.1 At the time those claims may have 
seemed outrageous and extravagant but, 
today, with a communist vote of just over 15 
percent in the presidential elections of May 
1981 and the parliamentary elections of the 
following month, and substantial socialist 
victories in those elections, they seem 
positively prophetic.
The victory of M itterrand in the 
presidential elections, and the left in the 
French parliamentary elections, marks a 
significant advance for the left in France. It 
compels us to look at some aspects of the 
history of the French left and its strategy for 
electoral victory as a way of understanding 
the situation of the socialist movement in 
France.
Here, I am examining the period of 
agreement between the left parties around the 
Common Programme of the French Left and 
looking at key aspects of the Programme 
itself and the events of the years 1972-78. 
What were the reasons for this temporary 
programmatic consolidation of the "Union of 
the Left"? How did the major parties, the PS 
and PCF, hope to benefit? What were the 
main points of agreement and difference? 
Why did the Common Programme fail and 
recede into history after the March 1978
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elections? What does the period tell us about 
the PCF and PS? These are the sorts of 
questions I seek to answer.
In many ways the logic of the recent 
socialist electoral victory and the communist 
setback was set up during the Common 
Programme years, particularly the time of its 
demise in late 1977 and early 1978. Then, the 
socialists, having made gains over the 
previous year, decided to  seize the 
opportunity and move out alone, looking for 
electoral victory while the communists 
stepped back.
The Common Programme
The Common Programme was signed by 
Georges Marchais, PCF Secretary-General, 
and Francois M itterrand on the night of June 
26-27, 1972. A few days later the Programme 
was endorsed by the Left Radicals. 
Immediately the PCF went out and publicised 
the Programme, publishing it in paperback. It 
was, as Feenberg remarks, "the sort of book 
that nobody reads"2 but its symbolic 
importance as a concrete showing of unity 
was paramount. Soon after publication by the 
PCF, the socialists and radicals put out their 
own editions.
The Common Programme was a plan of 
major, progressive reform for French society 
in the economy, in democracy, in welfare and 
social spheres; and in foreign policy. The 
economic proposals of the Programme were 
basic. M ajor na tio n alisa tio n s  in key 
industrial and financial areas of the economy 
were called for. In this enlarged public sector 
the workers would wield a greater influence 
th ro u g h  a sy stem  of " d e m o c ra tic  
management" which would put workers' 
representatives, probably from the trade 
unions, on the boards of management. The 
Common Programme also paid some 
attention to questions of quality of work, 
guaranteeing shorter hours, limited night 
shifts, regulation of work speed, increased job 
training, some access to study leave and 
technology and pollution controls.
In the social sphere a wide range of 
liberalisations and new freedoms were
proposed, ranging from recognition of 
tenants' unions through increased cultural 
funding and new student allowances to 
extended maternity leave and free legalised 
abortion. In international affairs the 
Common Programme proposed to abolish 
the French nuclear strike force,3 stop arms 
sales to colonial regimes, recognise the 
independence of the remaining French 
colonies, work for the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact and NATO, and continue co­
operation with the Common Market.
From the beginning there were problems in 
the campaign to promote the Common 
P rogram m e. The PS leader openly 
announced his aim of taking votes from the 
communists and the PCF showed its distrust 
of the PS. Marchais reported to the PCF 
Central Committee two days after the signing 
of the Common Programme that: "At the 
bottom, the ideology animating the Socialist 
Party is and remains absolutely reformist."4
The PS was quick to distance itself from the 
PCF when necessary. They also wished to 
push the PCF on the issues of its Soviet link 
and internal party democracy. This sort of 
tension and pressure was to be maintained 
throughout the period of the Common 
Programme, often peaking, then being 
resolved before important election times.
Despite these sorts of problems, the Union 
of the Left was maintained, moving from one 
electoral gain to another until it seemed 
certain to succeed in 1978. However, the 
tensions of electoral balance, theoretical 
differences and campaign difficulties proved 
too strong.
The Common Programme ended with the 
narrow defeat of the Union of the Left in the 
March 1978 National Assembly elections. 
The final disharmony that led to this defeat 
began in 1977 with the renegotiation of the 
details of the Common Programme. In 
September, the negotiations which had 
floundered over differences in interpretation 
of the Programme, and revisions to it, came to 
a standstill. Francois M itterrand had this to 
say:
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What is happening in the Communist Party? 
What's wrong here? Isn't it because the 
Socialist Party has become the first party of 
France, of the left, because we have carried 
off so many victories? As for our partners, 
they have stayed at the level where they 
were.5
Mitterrand laid the blame at the feet of the 
PCF, as a party that was not willing to take 
part in government, even a government of the 
left, if it was not dominant. In the run-up to 
the 1978 elections the PCF had to face the fact 
that its strategy to "strengthen the left", 
strengthen the PCF within the left” had failed. 
This was emphasised by the strong socialist 
and the only mediocre communist showing in 
the 1977 municipal elections. The mid-1977 
opinion polls showed 30 percent support for 
the PS and 21 percent for the PC F .6
This prospect of a secondary position in the 
left worried the communists, hence Marchais' 
announcement that "21 percent is not enough, 
25 percent would be good".7 Given the votes 
of the Left Radicals, this was tantamount to 
suggesting that the Socialist Party step back 
to being the junior partner, clearly an unreal 
demand and one unacceptable to the PS.
Tactical manoeuvring
But these splits were not simply a question 
of tactical electoral manoeuvring. There were, 
as observers at the time noted, "differing 
interpretations of the 1972 version of the 
Common Programme" — differences over 
how a left government would behave in 
France. There were problems over updating, 
in te rp re ta tio n  and ex tensions to  the 
Programme. Nationalisation, wealth tax 
measures, the concept of self-management 
and the cost of the Programme seem to have 
been the main problems.
After the 1977 failure in the negotiations, 
each party went on the offensive. The PCF 
publicly claimed that the PS had "moved to 
the right" and merely wished to "manage the 
social crisis in the interests of big capital and 
continue to impose austerity upon the 
workers.* The socialists, published their own 
version of an updated Common Programme.
The head-on position between the parties 
was maintained until after the first round of 
voting in March 1978. After a disappointing 
showing for the left, a peace meeting was 
convened and a patch-up agreement signed. 
T he fin a l re su lt show ed th a t th is 
rapprochement was seen as too shallow and 
had come too late. The left parties gained 
seats (the PS 9 and the PCF 12) but the gains 
were insufficient to win government.
The defeat of the left unleashed 
recriminations from both sides. The PCF 
Political Bureau stated firmly that: 'The 
direct cause of the failure of the left to come to 
power lies in the disastrous and suicidal 
strategy of the PS and nowhere else."10
The Executive Bureau of the Socialist Party 
called upon workers to judge the".... strategy 
of failure of the Communist Party, which had 
deprived them of their victory and of the 
changes which would have come to each of 
them ."11
Of far more interest was the outburst of 
criticism that arose within the PCF, an 
o u tb u rs t  th a t  was sp ea rh ea d ed  by 
intellectuals but seems to have had a 
substantial basis am ong rank-and-file 
militants as well. The debate that followed 
raised most of the key issues of the Common 
Programme.
The meaning of the Programme
What did the signing of the Common 
Programme mean for the PS and PCF? What 
did they hope to achieve with it? The answers 
reveal important tensions in the Union of the 
Left.
Both the PS and PCF wished to participate 
in a left government. There is no real reason to 
doubt this, despite the PCF's late 1977 and 
early 1978 behaviour. The socialists saw 
themselves as an almost purely electoral 
party; in fact without parliam entary 
rep resen ta tio n  they had little  power 
whatsoever. So it was clear for them. On the 
PCF, Georges Lavau noted that "for the 
moment, one thing is certain, that it wants to 
be in power. That is all we can say for sure."12 
But neither party wanted the power of
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government just for its own sake.
Of course both the socialists and the 
communists had made it clear right from the 
beginning that they wanted power and 
hegemony of the left. But they are political 
organisations of conviction and theory, both 
of them. They wanted government to put their 
vision into practice. Problems arose, 
however, when it became clear that the 
respective PS and PCF "visions" of the 
Com m on P rogram m e were m arkedly 
different.
F o r the  so c ia lis ts , the  C om m on 
Programme was a real programme of reform. 
It was exactly the kind of thing that a 
reforming social-democratic party and 
government should put into practice. The 
Programme amounted to the party's ends. 
The commitment of the Socialist Party to the 
sort of reform programme outlined in the 
Common Programme is made clear by its 
early 1972 pre-signing platform. It spelt out a 
series of progressive moves such as 
nationalisation of the banks and finance 
companies and some major industry, the 
setting up of a proportional representation 
electoral system, a ban on television 
advertising, legislation for free abortion and 
divorce by mutual consent, the repeal of the 
death sentence, nuclear dissolution and a 
move to wind down both NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact agreement.
Similarly the late 1977 pre-election update 
of the Common Programme suggested by the 
socialists shows them sticking to reform. 
Among the proposals agreed to by both sides 
in the updated Programme were: an increase 
in unemployment benefits to two-thirds of the 
minimum wage, reduction of the working 
week to 35 hours, the setting up of low-cost 
housing schemes, a consumer-level price 
freeze, new checks on m u ltina tional 
ownership, an extension of the proportional 
system in municipal elections and increased 
funding for welfare.
In addition, the socialists made concessions 
to the communists, agreeing to a new wealth 
tax, an increased number of nationalisations 
and an increased m inim um  w age . 13
Mitterrand was quite correct when he pointed 
out in January 1978 that the socialists had not 
abandoned the Common Programme and 
"were continuing to use it as their charter". 
That was true. What the communists failed to 
see properly was that the socialist vision was 
inherently limited and reformist.
The PCF vision
The PCF, on the other hand, had a 
different view of things. The Common 
Programme was not the end of things at all; it 
was the beginning, opening up a stage of 
"advanced democracy" which set up the 
possibility for a move to socialism. Socialism 
itself was something different. Early in the 
C om m on Program m e period  Georges 
Marchais pointed this out in a report'to the 
PCF Political Bureau. He said:
The Political Bureau considers that, even if 
the enterprise is difficult and nothing is won 
in advance, the conditions and the means 
exist which will permit the experiment to 
have a positive outcome, and that the 
common programme constitutes a step 
forward in the genera! struggle of the 
working class and of our people for social 
progress, democracy and socialism.14
The PCF had a concept, however limited it 
may have been in theoretical scope, of a 
process, of transition to a new kind of French 
society.
This view of the Common Programme as 
part of a strategy for socialism arose from the 
PCF's adherence, as late as 1977, to the thesis 
of "state monopoly capitalism". This thesis 
tends to see the state in the phase of late or 
monopoly capitalism as being "fused" with 
monopoly capital. It is "a state with no 
autonomy that is purely at the service of the 
monopolies".15
Arising from this view are two important 
strategic aspects. Firstly, a broad, democratic 
alliance has to be built, encompassing all 
those who are in opposition to the 
monopolies. This alliance is to be built so as to 
encourage broadness and such as to approach 
"men (and women) as they are, not as they
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should be. The PCF used the metaphor of the 
"bolted door" to illustrate the state in this 
phase. Only a huge and broad alliance could 
effectively confront the "bolted door" of the 
state and the monopolies. 16 The Common 
Programme was an attempt to construct this 
alliance. Secondly, because the state is seen as 
a simple tool in the service of monopoly the 
winning of government power is crucial in 
taking this tool out of the hands of the 
monopolies and putting it at the service of the 
people. The achieving of government, 
through the Union of the Left, therefore 
assumes great importance.
While it is true that this view of late 
capitalism, and of the transition to socialism, 
was subject to major criticism, mainly from 
the left of the PCF, this need not concern us 
overly much here. The critics claimed that the 
state monopoly capitalism thesis did not 
embody an understanding of contradiction 
within the state apparatus and the relative 
autonomy of the state. Socialist transition, 
therefore, was a much more complex thing 
involving an interaction of various economic, 
ideological and po litica l levels and 
complicated class alliances than just the 
simple anti-monopoly alliance.17 But these 
were all differences over the nature of the 
transition. That the PCF was talking about 
the transition to socialism was never in doubt.
With the bulk of the PS not seeing things 
this way, conflict was inevitable. Mitterrand, 
the real strategist for the Socialist Party, as 
well as its political leader, foretold the future 
that he planned for the communists.
The Communist Party is our natural ally .... 
I am not obliged to extend it any privilege; I 
am not obliged to give it preference. I 
observe simply that the unification of the 
Left involves the Communist Party .... And 
from this stems the importance which I 
attach to the formation of a political 
movement able first to achieve parity with 
and then dominate the Communist Party; 
and, finally, to obtain by itself a majority 
role .... One may doubt the sincerity of 
communist intentions, but to found a 
political strategy on the intentions one 
imputes to others makes no sense. What is 
important is to create the conditions which
make these others act as if they were sincere.
When M itterrand speaks of "sincerity" here 
he means keeping the communists within the 
bounds of the mainstream Socialist Party 
aims, that is, within the bounds of reform.
Austerity and capitalist crisis
Related to the question of what the 
Common Programme actually meant for the 
Socialist and Communist parties is the 
problem of how or whether a left government 
in France would cope with the capitalist crisis 
of the 1970s. For the Common Programme 
was formulated during a time of relative 
prosperity for the capitalist world. 1977-78 
was a different matter entirely. The now 
f a m i l i a r  p r o b le m s  o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  
unemployment, flagging production and 
lower consumer demand were very apparent 
to the parties of the left.
The socialists responded by stepping back. 
Their programme of reform, mentioned 
above, was maintained but restricted. Their 
commitment to wage increases, social welfare 
betterment, taxes on wealth and the like were 
tempered by the fear of exacerbating inflation 
and further dampening production. In the 
socialist sense and in the social-democratic 
sense, they wanted to retreat.
In Marchais' words, the Socialist Party's 
position
would have meant giving up our position on 
the minimum wage; giving up the immediate 
increase of purchasing power; the full extent 
of measures to reduce unemployment; .... 
the immediate reduction of hours of work 
and the introduction of a fifth week of paid 
holidays; giving up effective nationalisation 
of banking and finance and of the nine 
industrial groupings put forward in 1971; 
giving up the tax on capital and wealth. It 
would also have meant giving up the 
democratic content of the common 
programme ,...18
He may have been a little off-beam with the 
claims about "giving up" nationalisation and 
any form of wealth tax but essentially the
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PCF Secretary General was correct. In the 
PCF's eyes this was nothing more than 
capitulation which would force "austerity" 
upon the people of France as a way to revive 
the economy. The PCF was not interested "in 
managing the capitalist crisis".
For the PCF, as a responsible party of the 
left, is this really the response? Indeed, were 
they asking the right questions? Need the 
battle for left government be one of managing 
the crisis or nothing? That was how the PCF 
seemed to respond.
Did the PCF condemnation of the PS mean 
that it actually thought the socialists had 
changed their spots? The suggestion that the 
PS had "turned to the right" as the 
Communist Party claimed seems to indicate 
this to be the case. But how consistent is this 
view of a change with the view expressed at 
the same time that the socialists were always 
interested in managing the system and no 
more? Marchais, in a later section of the same 
report quoted above, claimed that the 
Socialist Party had not changed its nature 
since the signing of the Common Programme.
Six years of experience have shown that the 
Socialist Party did not undergo any real 
change .... Under the cover of a leftist and 
pro-unity phraseology, which allowed them 
to win over people who were sincerely in 
favour of unity and change, it remained a 
social-democratic party, which does not 
aime to bring about democratic change.20
The confusion of the communist leader's 
position comes through. The real situation 
was that the PCF could no longer keep a 
basically social-democratic party from 
making the concessions any party of that kind 
would make in the face of capitalist crisis. The 
Socialist Party had strengthened its position 
in the Union to that extent. Now the problem 
for the communists was whether to take the 
measure of progressive reforms they could get 
(and remember that the socialists'concessions 
were still quite "left" by comparison to most 
social-democratic policies to be found around 
the world at the time) or reject the alliance 
altogether.
Were the communists really sure that even
their optimal version of the Common 
Programme would benefit France's working 
people under the sort of conditions prevailing 
in 1978? After all, the Common Programme, 
even when including the new nationalisations 
wanted by the PCF, was still only a 
programme of advanced democratic reform
— it was not socialism. Surely the very logic 
of the PCF's Common Programme transition 
strategy would bestow the same status (if less 
favourably) upon the Socialist Party's 
watered down version? It would still "open 
up" the possibility for change while 
substantially improving the lot of French 
workers and their allies.
None of the areas of concession mentioned 
by Marchais, not even the possibility of 
austerity measures, take from the Common 
Programme its strategic emphasis, its concept 
of change as a process rather than an event or 
a government decree, it seems that really the 
PCF had lost faith in its strategy, or didn't 
understand that strategy when it came close to 
really putting it into practice. Rather than 
confront this the Communist Party almost 
seemed to prefer staying in a more 
comfortable but less responsible opposition.
The result was unsatisfactory for the left as 
a whole and for the Communist Party. The 
left was to remain out of government, 
meaning that no reforms, no matter how 
minimal, of the left programme could be put 
into practice. Within the left, the Socialist 
Party gave the appearance of being the 
responsible partner in the union, the one that 
was at least willing to make a go of governing 
even under difficulty. The Communist Party 
was seen, correctly, as the abstentionist party 
content to remain "within the fortress" with its 
solid 20 percent vote and make few advances. 
That this could in time weaken even that 20 
percent support was a possibility not lost to 
critics within the party.
These same critics also took the view that 
many of the battles, including those over 
austerity and nationalisation, could have 
been fought out within a Union of the Left 
government rather than within a left fighting 
for electoral victory — an argument that 
makes perfect electoral sense, especially in
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terms of the sort of socialist strategy mapped 
out by the Common Programme.21 The PCF 
would then have shown a proper willingness 
as a communist party to take on the 
responsibility of government even in difficult 
circumstances, as a part of the struggle for 
advanced democracy and socialism.
This is a position that was, in my view, 
more honest with both the electorate and 
communist militants, an honesty which the 
PCF failed to deliver.
Ownership and control 
of industry
The actual "break" on the left occurred over 
nationalisations. The immediate tension was 
over the interpretation of the 1972 version of 
the Programme. The issue was whether 
subsidiaries with less than 100 percent 
ownership by a major firm listed in the 
"group" for nationalisation would be 
similarly treated, a move which added over 
one thousand firms to the original group of 
nine; whether six more industrial giants, 
including all of the steel industry, would be 
added to the list, and whether a left 
government would nationalise a particular 
company in the event of its workers 
expressing a wish'for the company to be taken 
into public ownership.22
There were two crucial theoretical 
questions involved with nationalisation 
which, apart from the electoral and 
immediate economic concern of the cost of 
compensation, illustrated further differences. 
One involved the econom ic role of 
nationalisation. The other involved the 
question of self-management.
The socialists did not see widespread 
nationalisation as being all that important, 
while the communists obviously did. Holland 
cites a number of French sources to suggest 
that on interpretation of the 1972 Programme 
"it is possible to give the PCF a good deal of 
benefit on the overall doubt".23 He points out 
that, given that most large corporations are 
themselves composed of subsidiaries with 
varying shares of percentage ownership, it is 
not really clear that nationalisation would be 
meaningful had subsidiaries with a 51 percent
or more holding by the major corporation not 
been included. Certainly it would have made 
government influence over the economy more 
difficult, something the socialists were less 
concerned about, certainly in the short term.
Many socialists were not firm on major 
nationalisation at all. For some of them, 
including economic adviser Jacques Attali, 
and former United Socialist Party leader 
Michel Rocard, the question of control was 
more central to both influencing the economy 
and improving the lives of workers. They took 
up the slogan first raised in 1968 — 
"autogestion" or self-management. It was not 
clear whether the official PS version of self­
management was a form of participation in 
running industry or something more. In any 
case, they argued that the key to socialism was 
a change in the "social relations" of 
p ro d u c tio n  and co n tro l ra th e r than  
ownership and that therefore to demand 
major nationalisation alone was to bark up 
the wrong tree.
The communists disagreed, arguing that 
ownership remained crucial. Their model of 
"democratic management" was no real 
solution to the problem of control though. At 
best it offered another bureaucratic layer on 
the participation thesis. Under the PCF's 
proposal, industry would be run by a board 
with government and union representatives 
participating. Any active role would be 
removed from the rank-and-file worker and 
put in the hands of his/her union official. Not 
coincidentally, the French union movement 
was under the major influence of the 
co m m u n is t-d o m in a te d  C o n fe d e ra tio n  
Generale du Travail (CGT). The PCF 
proposal would give the party itself major 
influence when the government and union 
representatives were combined. This is hardly 
a fully "democratic" alternative.
The fo rm u la tio n  of the Com m on 
Programme which read that "on the basis of a 
large public and nationalised sector, the 
government will favour, in law and in reality, 
the development of democratic forms of 
management"24, masked both the differences 
the parties had on this question and the fact 
that neither of them understood exactly what
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it meant when they appropriated the term 
autogestion. During the 1978 election 
campaign the PCF did an about-face and 
began using the term "autogestion", a term 
which they had previously derided. This did 
not seem to alter their view of the role of 
workers in management but is an indication 
of the influence and importance of the 
concept in France.
The left and the new 
social movements
An important feature of the M ay/June 
events in 1968 was the spotlighting of an 
emerging, articulate "middle strata" of 
salaried workers and professionals. The 
Common Programme was in some ways a 
response to this and represented a shift of 
these strata, or a portion of them, to the 
consolidated left. Both the PS and the PCF 
recognised the importance of this.
The Common Programme therefore had a 
strong flavour of developing new freedoms in 
the personal and private spheres of life and 
towards understanding the new "quality of 
life" movements that had their basis in the 
cultural shifts of the 1960s. A decisive nod was 
made in the direction of the ecology 
movement, the movement for women's rights 
and liberation, self-management as we have 
noted, the homosexual movement (to a small 
extent), the student movement and others.
The Union of the Left as a whole was 
successful in raising the hopes of these groups 
and these middle strata. The problem of party 
competition arose here again, however, the 
Socialist Party being much more successful 
than the communists in gaining voter 
support. As George Ross points out, the PCF 
was aware of the problem and engaged in a 
number of publicity-type operations stressing 
its devotion to democracy and freedom and 
the issues it knew appealed. But it was not 
believed. Why? Principally because of the 
party's past and the time needed to prove itself 
different. In any case, the party needed time to 
understand the issues itself. Ross observed 
that
While things were changing in the PCF, the
party was unable to convince intermediary 
social groups that they had changed enough. 
Beyond this the PCF demonstrated an 
almost perverse reluctance to broach issues 
which were obviously salient to new middle 
class groups in ways which would be 
favourably received. In the 1970's 
autogestion, feminism and ecology 
(including the nuclear power issue) all 
caused great concern in new middle groups. 
On all of these issues the PCF scorned the 
arguments which were put forward by the 
protest groups which raised these issues.25
The Socialist Party which had brought 
together some of the elements involved in the 
'68 events managed to gather this support. 
This was probably the most important area 
which confirmed the socialist advances 
through the period of the Common 
Programme while the communist position 
stagnated. The communsits, quite simply, 
could not break out of their old logic. This 
was essential if it was to move beyond its 
position of the formal, staid French left 
opposition. Althusser, and others such as 
theorist Jean Ellenstein, saw this opportunity 
in the practice of the Common Programme. 
There was a need, he said, to abandon
fortress-like withdrawal and (begin) 
resolutely involving the Party in the mass 
movement, extending its zone of influence 
through struggle, and finding in that mass 
oriented struggle, the real reasons for 
transforming the Party, by giving it the life 
that comes fiom the masses.26
Strategy and alliance
When analysing the relationship between 
the PCF and the PS around the Common 
Programme, the communist leadership used 
to like talking about "the struggle for the 
common programme". I have emphasised a 
number of times already the competitive 
nature of the Union of the Left. Usually this 
competition is seen just in terms of votes but 
we now know it was more than that. 
Programmatic points, attitudes to social 
change and the allegiance of the working class 
and middle strata were involved too.
This raises the question of the nature of 
alliances. How do parties of the social-
40 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 80
democratic and communist left engage in 
electoral agreements and strategic alliances?
The socialists were clear on this. 
Mitterrand's many statements show that they 
hoped to win votes, limit the scope of 
communist influence and put their reform 
programme into practice. The communists 
were not so clear. At times it seemed that the 
communists were involved in the union 
merely to come to power and gain dominance 
over the Socialist Party on the left. But is that 
a sufficient view for a party concerned with 
socialist transition?
It is not enough to see an alliancc of this 
sort in terms of votes alone. Of course, votes 
are important as a measure of support and as 
a way to gain office, thereby allowing policies 
to be put into practice. But M archais'dictum 
of "21 percent is not enough, 25 percent would 
be good" goes no further than that at all. It is 
simply a statement of the desire to dominate 
the PS.
There are problems with Marchais' 
formula. Firstly, consider the trade union 
movement. With the Communist Party 
holding sway in the huge trade union 
federation, the CGT, need it worry about 
being an "auxiliary force" to the socialists in 
the wider political sphere? But more 
important than evening up the political 
balance, the communist role in the trade 
union movement gives it a strategic lever in 
the heartland of socialist politics, in the key 
organisations of workers' defence. The 
alliance can then be built and fought for at 
another political level. Democratic and 
socialist change can be struggled for in the 
workplace and in the union movement. That 
is, if the Communist Party understood and 
worked for other aspects of the alliance than 
the purely electoral.
The second problem with Marchais' 
approach was precisely that it did see the 
alliance as purely electoral. Hence the ease 
with which it could be sacrificed when it 
became clear that electoral advantage was not 
accruing to the PCF. But alliances for 
democratic and socialist transition must work 
at more than the electoral level. They must
extend to involve classes and class fractions, 
seeking to win them over to more advanced 
positions. In communist jargon, alliances 
must be forged and won amongst the masses. 
The PCF made the mistake of leaving the 
agreements and battles at the level of formal 
agreement between parties rather than 
agreement and struggle between ideas 
amongst the people.
For example, the Programme was signed, it 
was printed and distributed but there was 
only a limited attempt to have it discussed and 
acted upon. Propaganda and slogans do not 
replace the taking up of issues in the mass way 
suggested earlier. That would be the sort of 
thing that would help to build the alliance on 
two fronts — one of formal party agreement, 
the other a transitional or "counter- 
hegemonic" approach to alliances. This was 
very much the "left" criticism within the PCF 
expressed forcefully by Althusser and 
Balibar. Ellenstein, representing the "right" 
dissidents was no less firm on the need to 
broaden the struggle for the Programme. At 
the time, left and right differences over the 
strategy seemed minimal, most of them 
having related to the earlier issue of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat.
Democracy and stalinisrn
These were the issues which party activists 
were discussing in the period leading up to, 
and especially after, the defeat of the left in the 
1978 elections. We have dealt mainly with the 
questions raised in the PCF and by 
communist intellectuals because it was in that 
party where the most discussion took place, at 
least as far as we can tell, and where the 
discussion reached a theoretical depth. The 
socialists certainly had their splits and 
dissensions after March 1978, but these seem 
to have been in the more traditional mould of 
leadership challenges and factional squabbles 
than m ajor theo re tical and strateg ic 
debates.27
For the Communist Party and its internal 
critics, there was one overriding concern — 
the question of democracy within the party 
and the break with stalinisrn. It was the
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strength or weakness of the party as an open 
and democratic organisation which would 
determine whether the whole range of tactical 
and strategic questions regarding the Union 
of the Left would be asked and answered at 
all. Party democracy was paramount — a 
problem to be solved before others could be 
properly approached.
Hence the stress all post-election comments 
placed on the need for discussion, self- 
criticism and openness. No matter whether 
the criticism came from the "light" or the 
"left" of the party, this emphasis was 
consistent. For example, Jean Ellenstein said:
It has become clearer now that the PCF will 
have to carry out the initiatives symbolised 
by the 22nd congress to their conclusion in 
every field ....
Whatever the issue .... many communists 
have asked questions about the methods 
used .... and have criticised them ....
Let it not be said that these are intellectual 
problems for intellectuals. They are relevant 
questions hundreds of thousands of 
communists are asking themselves today. 
The party's refusal to discuss them in public 
appears to be more tragic than it really is. 
What would be tragic however is if it 
continued to reject the public discussion that 
so many communists are looking forward 
to .28
ana Louis Althusser:
The defeat of the Union of the Left has 
seriously confused the popular masses and 
filled many communists with profound 
disquiet. A 'workerist' — or more precisely 
sectarian — faction is openly rejoicing at 
the break with the Socialist Party, 
presenting it as a victory over the social- 
democratic danger.... While they wait for 
an explanation from the Party leadership, 
the militants are themselves beginning to 
analyse the process that led to the defeat: 
namely, the line actually followed by the 
Party, with all its somersaults, and the 
vagaries of its practice .... 29
Ellenstein and Althusser joined forces to 
the extent that they, along with over 100 other 
party members, banded together to publish
an open letter to the party leadership in the 
May 17 edition of Le Monde. Although there 
was a certain naivety in the expectations of 
the critics, in that at times they seemed to 
suggest that merely by opening up debate and 
by making some structural changes to 
encourage that debate, the problems of 
French communism would be solved, their 
criticisms seem justified and pointed.
The PCF and the Comintern
The PCF had had a long history of enclosed 
behaviour. It was the perverse "model" of 
Leninism that developed in the stalinist 
period of the Third International. In the 
period of the Union of the Left, in all its stages 
from the PCF's first suggestions in the 1960s 
to the break in 1978, there had been pressure 
on the Communist Party to break with its 
stalinist past. This would, on one hand, 
sweeten the pill for the socialists, hesitant 
about an alliance with the PCF and, on the 
other hand, take the party further towards 
establishing the independence and democracy 
demanded by the need to distance itself from 
the Soviet Union and find a place among the 
Eurocommunists.
B oth  these needs were m u tu a lly  
advantageous and, for a period, the PCF 
seemed to be responding in concrete ways. 
One of the great promises of the Common 
Programme for the communist movement in 
France and elsewhere was that it showed new, 
less sectarian, more open and co-operative 
ways forward, and showed the ability ol 
communist parties to change. There were 
lapses of course. Even one of the PCF's most 
symbolic "breaks" with the past — the 
abandonment of the "dictatorship of the 
proletariat" formulation — was done in the 
old undemocratic way. Georges Marchais 
announced the fact on television one week 
before the 22nd congress decision and 
without adequate or reasonable debate. For 
democrats in the party, even those that agreed 
with the move, this was considered 
outrageous. But, overall, a hopeful process 
was occurring.
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The events of 1977-78, the twists of the 
party line, the break with the PS followed by 
its hasty patching up between rounds of 
voting and the defeat of the Union must have 
brought unpleasant memories to the minds of 
many. These events amounted to a setback for 
the process of real democratisation in the 
PCF. The stifling of debate and the isolating 
of critics (and the later expulsions) after the 
election marked the defeat for this process.
The Union of the Left became impossible to 
restore after the 1978 election defeat. The 
Socialist Party regrouped and prepared to 
battle on as the major force on the left. The 
PCF retreated behind its traditional "buffer 
zone" of the 20 percent vote. Within the party 
itself the sectarian anti-Eurocommunist 
faction gained support while the critics 
mentioned above continued to be vocal.
Despite the conventional analysis which 
solely blames the Marchais leadership for the 
shift back to the methods of old, a more 
refined view sees the general secretary and his 
supporters playing a balancing act at the head 
of a very divided party .30
The party has remained in that divided 
state to this day. Despite the presence of four 
communist ministers in the government and 
despite continued hopes for socialist change 
in France, the PCF has not consolidated or 
gained from the left victory in 1981. Reports 
suggest that party activism is at its lowest ebb 
since the 1930s; membership is down and 
party-sponsored surveys suggest its popular 
vote is now as low as 10 percent, well below 
the old "buffer zone".31
Clearly, there is a need for a reassessment 
and overhaul of the PCF's current strategy. 
The recently concluded 24th congress seems 
not to have succeeded in that regard. All 
reports suggest that the party's course has
NOTES
1. At the 14th Congress of the Socialist 
International on June 25, 1972.
2. Andrew Feenberg, "Socialism in France?", 
Socialist Revolution, No 19, Jan/March 1974, 
p.ll.
been maintained with the leadership group 
being re-elected, the anti-Socialist Party and 
pro-Soviet sentiments confirmed, and the re­
examination of the Common Programme 
concluding that it was all a mistake.
Beneath the veneer of unity, which seems to 
have been designed mainly to restore inner- 
party spirit, there are developments which 
foreshadow changes that may come.
The socialist government is now facing 
criticism from the left, particularly for its 
decision to cut workers' pay in return for 
shorter working hours.32 Many will look to 
the PCF and the communist-dominated trade 
unions for a response on the left. There is a 
suggestion th a t respected com m unist 
Transport Minister, Charles Fiterman, may 
head a push for liberalisation within the 
party, and a dissident group led by former 
Paris city councillor, Henri Fizbin, publishes 
a eurocom m unist-leaning weekly with 
growing support. This group, the Rencontres 
Communistes recently published the Italian 
communists' condemnation of Polish martial 
law in full, a direct challenge to the official 
PCF line.33 Even at the 24th congress there 
was official recognition that the party failed 
to properly "draw the right conclusions" from 
the Soviet de-stalinisation of 1956.34 A 
reassessment of that period is essential to any 
overhaul of the PCF's general strategy.
All indications suggest that those who 
hoped for the demise of the French 
Communist Party in the period of the socialist 
government will be disappointed. The PCF 
will be around for some time, during which it 
will face the responsibility of government 
along with its reluctant socialist partners. 
Several years of left government may give the 
PCF the chance to learn the lessons of the past 
and begin again the process of democratic and 
socialist transition.
3. Later abandoned by both the PCF and the PS.
4. Ronald Tiersky, "French Communism in 
1976", Problems o f Communism, Winter 1976, 
p.37.
To Live Better, To Change Life 43
5. Le Monde, Sept 27, 1977.
6. Frank L. Wilson, "The French CP's 
Dilemma", Problems o f communism, Winter 1978, 
p.4.
7. Guardian Weekly (the weekly English section 
of Le Monde, hereafter GW), Jan 22, 1978.
8. GW, Feb 19, 1978.
9. L'Humanite, Nov 11, 1977.
10. L'Humanite, April 5, 1978.
11. Le Monde, April 14, 1978.
12. Georges Lavau, "The PCF, the State and the 
Revolution", in Blackmer & Tarrow, Communism 
in Italy & France (Princeton, 1975), p. 129.
13. GW, Jan 7, 1978.
14. Georges Marchais, "Along the road of the 
22nd Congress", Eurored (a publication of the 
Comunist Party of Great Britain), No 7, p.8.
15. For a critical outline of this thesis see Nicos 
Poulantzas, State Power Socialism (London, 
1978), pp. 127-139.
16. Etienne Balibar, "The Responsibilities of 
Communists", Eurored, No 8.
17. In the context of the Common Programme, 
see Louis Althusser "What Must Change in the 
Party", New Left Review (NLR), 109, p.36.
19. Mitterrand, Ma part de verite, pp.78-9 and 
pp.71-2. Cited by Tiersky, French Communism 
1920-72 (New York, 1974), p.402.
19. Marchais, op cit, p. 10.
20. ibid, p. 12.
21. See Jean Ellenstein "Time for Reappraisal", 
GW, April 15, Althusser, ibid, pp.23-5 and pp.42-
3. Balibar, op cit.
22. Stuart Holland, 'The New Communist 
Economies", in Torre, Mortimer, Story (eds), 
E u r o c o m m u n i s m :  M y t h  or R e a l i t y  
(Harmondsworth, 1979).
23. ibid, p.221.
24. ibid, p.220.
25. George Ross, "Crisis in Eurocommunism: 
The French Case", Socialist Register 1978, p. 174.
26. Althusser, op cit, p.44.
27. GW, July 1978, p. 11.
28. Ellenstein, "Time for reappraisal", G W, April
15, 1978, p.ll.
29. Althusser, op cit, pp. 19, 20.
30. See Jane Jenson and George Ross, 
"Strategies in Conflict: The Twenty-third Congress 
of the French Communist Party", Socialist 
Review, No 47, pp.96,97.
31. New York Times, Feb 4, 1982.
32. Sydney Morning Herald, Feb 27, 1982.
33. New York Times, op cit.
34. Guardian (daily), Feb 2, 1982.
35. ibid.
Save $5.00 on a Joint 
Tribune/ALR 
Subscription 
A New Discount Offer
Tribune and Australian Left Review are 
making a regular discount offer for a year's 
Tribune and six issues of ALR for $32, plus a 
free copy of Polish Voices.
Send to ALR, Box A247, Sydney South 
PO, Sydney 2000.
